
John H. Garvey, as this article notes, has "heartily" endorsed John Stuart Mill's argument about liberty of thought and discussion as a way forward. This is most unfortunate since in Mill, utilitarianism reached its full development. Utilitarianism, a school of thought founded by Jeremy Bentham, a leader of political and legislative reform in England, holds that the goal of our aspirations is pleasure. This school of thought historically grew out of hedonism.
In Memory and Identity, Pope John Paul II explains how utilitarianism ignores (and therefore betrays) the bonum honestum - the just good. His Holiness writes, "...European traditions, especially those of the Enlightenment period, have recognized the need for a criterion to regulate the use of freedom. Yet the criterion adopted has not been so much that of the just good (bonum honestum) as that of utility or pleasure. Here we are faced with a most important element in the tradition of European thought, one to which we must now devote a little more attention. In human action, the different spiritual faculties tend toward a synthesis in which the leading role is played by the will. The subject thus imprints his own rationality upon his actions. Human acts are free and, as such, they engage the responsibility of the subject. Man wants a particular good and he chooses it: he is consequently responsible for his choice.
Against the background of this vision of good, which is both metaphysical and anthropological, there arises a distinction of properly ethical character. It is the distinction between the just good (bonum honestum), the useful good (bonum utile), and the pleasurable good (bonum delectabile). These three types of good are intimately bound up with human action. When he acts, man chooses a certain good, which becomes the goal of his action. If the subject chooses a bonum honestum, his goal is conformed to the very essence of the object of his action and is therefore a just goal. When on the other hand the object of his choice is a bonum utile, the goal is the advantage to be gained from it for the subject. The question of the morality of the action remains open: only when the action bringing the advantage is just and the means used are just, can the subject's goal also be said to be just. It is precisely on this issue that a rift begins to emerge between the Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical tradition and modern utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism ignores the first and fundamental dimension of good, that of the bonum honestum. Utilitarian anthropology and the ethic derived from it set out from the conviction that man tends essentially toward his own interest or that of the group to which he belongs. Ultimately, the aim of human action is personal or corporate advantage. As for the bonum delectabile, it is of course taken into account in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. The great exponents of this current of thought, in their ethical reflection, are fully aware that the accomplishment of a just good is always accompanied by an interior joy - the joy of the good. In utilitarian thought, however, the dimension of good and the dimension of joy have been displaced by the search for advantage or pleasure. In this scheme, the bonum delectabile of Thomistic thought has been somehow emancipated, becoming both a good and an end in itself. In the utilitarian vision, man in acting seeks pleasure above all else, not the honestum.
Admittedly, utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill emphasize that the goal is not simply pleasure at sense level: spiritual pleasures also come into play. They say that these too must be considered in making the so-called 'calculation of pleasures.' It is this calculation which, to their way of thinking, constitutes the 'normative' expression of the utilitarian ethic: the greatest happiness of the greatest number. All human action, individually and jointly, has to conform to this principle." (Memory and Identity, pp. 34-36).
John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism, as Pope John Paul II explained so eloquently, is not a way forward. Mill was a tragic figure himself. An atheist who took great pains to hide his atheism and to keep it out of his philosophical works. In a letter to Auguste Comte dated December 18, 1841, Mill wrote, "Doubtless you are not unaware of the fact that here in England the writer who would openly profess anti-religious, nay more, anti-Christian opinions would compromise not only his social position, which I believe I could sacrifice for a sufficiently noble cause, but also and more seriously, his chances of being read. Already I am risking much by carefully putting aside, from the very outset of my work, any religious viewpoint, abstaining from declamatory praises of providential wisdom, usually employed by the philosophers of my country, even by the unbelievers. I rarely make allusions to this order of ideas, endeavoring, above all, not to arouse in the ordinary reader any religious antipathies. I believe I have written in such a manner that no thinker, Christian or unbeliever, can be mistaken about the genuine character of my opinions. I rely somewhat, I admit it, on a worldy prudence which here in England prevents religious writers in general from proclaiming unnecessarily the irreligion of the scientific spirit of any value."
Reflect very carefully on these words: "I believe I have written in such a manner that no thinker, Christian or unbeliever, can be mistaken about the genuine character of my opinions." Surely this includes one who has served as dean of Boston College Law School. And yet, Mr. Garvey holds the thought of John Stuart Mill as "a way forward."
God save Catholic University of America. God save the Catholic Church in the United States.
In Memory and Identity, Pope John Paul II explains how utilitarianism ignores (and therefore betrays) the bonum honestum - the just good. His Holiness writes, "...European traditions, especially those of the Enlightenment period, have recognized the need for a criterion to regulate the use of freedom. Yet the criterion adopted has not been so much that of the just good (bonum honestum) as that of utility or pleasure. Here we are faced with a most important element in the tradition of European thought, one to which we must now devote a little more attention. In human action, the different spiritual faculties tend toward a synthesis in which the leading role is played by the will. The subject thus imprints his own rationality upon his actions. Human acts are free and, as such, they engage the responsibility of the subject. Man wants a particular good and he chooses it: he is consequently responsible for his choice.
Against the background of this vision of good, which is both metaphysical and anthropological, there arises a distinction of properly ethical character. It is the distinction between the just good (bonum honestum), the useful good (bonum utile), and the pleasurable good (bonum delectabile). These three types of good are intimately bound up with human action. When he acts, man chooses a certain good, which becomes the goal of his action. If the subject chooses a bonum honestum, his goal is conformed to the very essence of the object of his action and is therefore a just goal. When on the other hand the object of his choice is a bonum utile, the goal is the advantage to be gained from it for the subject. The question of the morality of the action remains open: only when the action bringing the advantage is just and the means used are just, can the subject's goal also be said to be just. It is precisely on this issue that a rift begins to emerge between the Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical tradition and modern utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism ignores the first and fundamental dimension of good, that of the bonum honestum. Utilitarian anthropology and the ethic derived from it set out from the conviction that man tends essentially toward his own interest or that of the group to which he belongs. Ultimately, the aim of human action is personal or corporate advantage. As for the bonum delectabile, it is of course taken into account in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. The great exponents of this current of thought, in their ethical reflection, are fully aware that the accomplishment of a just good is always accompanied by an interior joy - the joy of the good. In utilitarian thought, however, the dimension of good and the dimension of joy have been displaced by the search for advantage or pleasure. In this scheme, the bonum delectabile of Thomistic thought has been somehow emancipated, becoming both a good and an end in itself. In the utilitarian vision, man in acting seeks pleasure above all else, not the honestum.
Admittedly, utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill emphasize that the goal is not simply pleasure at sense level: spiritual pleasures also come into play. They say that these too must be considered in making the so-called 'calculation of pleasures.' It is this calculation which, to their way of thinking, constitutes the 'normative' expression of the utilitarian ethic: the greatest happiness of the greatest number. All human action, individually and jointly, has to conform to this principle." (Memory and Identity, pp. 34-36).
John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism, as Pope John Paul II explained so eloquently, is not a way forward. Mill was a tragic figure himself. An atheist who took great pains to hide his atheism and to keep it out of his philosophical works. In a letter to Auguste Comte dated December 18, 1841, Mill wrote, "Doubtless you are not unaware of the fact that here in England the writer who would openly profess anti-religious, nay more, anti-Christian opinions would compromise not only his social position, which I believe I could sacrifice for a sufficiently noble cause, but also and more seriously, his chances of being read. Already I am risking much by carefully putting aside, from the very outset of my work, any religious viewpoint, abstaining from declamatory praises of providential wisdom, usually employed by the philosophers of my country, even by the unbelievers. I rarely make allusions to this order of ideas, endeavoring, above all, not to arouse in the ordinary reader any religious antipathies. I believe I have written in such a manner that no thinker, Christian or unbeliever, can be mistaken about the genuine character of my opinions. I rely somewhat, I admit it, on a worldy prudence which here in England prevents religious writers in general from proclaiming unnecessarily the irreligion of the scientific spirit of any value."
Reflect very carefully on these words: "I believe I have written in such a manner that no thinker, Christian or unbeliever, can be mistaken about the genuine character of my opinions." Surely this includes one who has served as dean of Boston College Law School. And yet, Mr. Garvey holds the thought of John Stuart Mill as "a way forward."
God save Catholic University of America. God save the Catholic Church in the United States.
Related reading: John H. Garvey and academic freedom.
